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D URING this survey period the appellate courts of Texas handed down
numerous decisions involving various rules of evidence. The cases of
greatest significance lie in the following substantive areas: (1) Expert
Opinion Evidence; (2) The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions; (3) Dead
Man's Statute; (4) No Probative Evidence; (5) Best Evidence Rule; (6) Im-
peachment; and (7) Parol Evidence.
I. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
Competency. Texas courts have long followed the rule articulated in
Bowles v. Bourdon' that requires a medical doctor testifying as an expert
witness in a medical malpractice case to be of the same school of medical
practice as the defendant-doctor. 2 If the subject of inquiry is common to
and equally developed in all fields of practice, however, any physician fa-
miliar with and trained in the area may testify as to the requisite standard
of care.3 In Sears v. Cooper4 the court of civil appeals liberally construed
the "common to and equally developed" criterion and allowed a patholo-
gist to testify as an expert medical witness against a general practitioner.
The jury found the defendant-doctor negligent. The doctor appealed,
claiming no evidence or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to support the
jury's findings. The plaintiffs primary expert witness at trial, a California
pathologist, testified that the plaintiff suffered from an electrolyte imbal-
ance that was aggravated by a diuretic prescribed by the defendant, and
that this aggravation resulted in brain damage. Relying on the rule set
forth in Bowles, the appellant attacked much of the pathologist's testimony
* LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston,
Texas.
** J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
2. Id at 5, 219 S.W.2d at 782. The Bowles court made clear that the defendant-doc-
tor's school or method of practice must be of good standing and one that has established
rules and principles to guide its members. Id.
3. Porter v. Puryear, 153 Tex. 82, 262 S.W.2d 933 (1953), rev'd after second rehearing,
264 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1954).
4. 574 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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on the ground that the standard of care applicable to specialists differs
from that of general practitioners and that, as a result, the pathologist's
testimony could not support the jury's findings. The appellate court re-
jected this contention. The court determined that the plaintiffs expert had
established, through his testimony, that the standards relating to the pre-
scribing of a diuretic are uniform throughout the four states in which he
had practiced, including Texas.5 The court concluded that the evidence
showing uniformity was sufficient to bring the pathologist's testimony
within the rule established in Porter v. Puryear.6 Accordingly, the Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The competency of a medical expert to testify regarding the applicable
standard of care was also presented in Guidry v. Philps.7 In Guidry the
plaintiff sued the defendant-doctor, alleging malpractice, negligence,
fraud, and breach of warranty in the performance of unnecessary surgery
to cure the plaintiffs asthma. The trial court entered judgment for the
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. One of the plaintiffs points of error
on appeal was the trial court's exclusion of that portion of the plaintiffs
expert's testimony regarding the standard of care applicable at the time of
the operation. The court excluded the expert's testimony on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to establish the expert's competency to testify
as to the appropriate standard of care on the date of the operation. Re-
versing and remanding the case, the court of civil appeals inferred the
medical expert's familiarity with the standard of care that existed on the
date of the operation, noting that during the period in question the plain-
tiffs expert was a licensed physician pursuing intensive studies in the area
of pulmonary disease.8
During the survey period Texas courts also considered the competency
of witnesses to testify as experts in specialties other than medicine.
Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court, and a determination that a witness is com-
petent will be reversed on appeal only upon a clear abuse of discretion.9
For example, in In re B_ S_ L & R A
5. 574 S.W.2d at 615. In holding that the pathologist's testimony was sufficient to es-
tablish the same standard of care concerning the prescription of diuretics, the court of civil
appeals observed that the defendant had not challenged the qualifications of the expert wit-
ness on this ground at trial. Id Consequently, whether a specialist is competent to establish
the requisite standard of care for a general practitioner could be decided differently if objec-
tion to the specialist's qualifications is properly made.
6. 153 Tex. 82, 262 S.W.2d 933 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 264 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.
1954); see text accompanying note 2 supra.
7. 580 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
8. The evidence indicated that the witness graduated from the University of Colorado
Medical School in 1958 with an M.D. degree, spent the next year in an internship training
program, and then had one year of medical specialty residency at the University of Michi-
gan. He subsequently had two additional years of medical specialty training at the Univer-
sity of Colorado, ending in 1962. In 1963, he had training in the sub-specialty of pulmonary
disease, which made him Board qualified in the area of pulmonary diseases. Id at 885.
9. E.g., Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967); 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1401 (2d ed. 1956).
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L , an action seeking modification of the custodial provisions of a
prior divorce decree, I° the ex-wife offered the testimony of a purported
expert recommending that her managing conservatorship not be disturbed.
The witness, an adoption case worker, had a bachelor's degree in elemen-
tary education, a master's degree in "Family Relations and Early Child-
hood Development," and a history of employment as a first grade teacher
and subsequently as a special education teacher. The trial court excluded
the testimony on the ground that the witness was not qualified as an expert
to express a recommendation that the ex-wife should maintain custody
over the minor children. The ex-wife appealed her removal as managing
conservator, claiming, as one point of error, that the trial court erred in
excluding the caseworker's testimony. In affirming the trial court's exclu-
sion of the witness's testimony, the court of civil appeals concluded that
experience as a first grade teacher or participation in special education
programs does not qualify an individual "to evaluate environments, attrib-
utes and personalities of parents and children and other circumstances
which must be considered in determining what may be for the best interest
of children in custody disputes."" Because no other evidence was
presented demonstrating that the witness had gained a measure of exper-
tise in any special area,' 2 the appellate court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the witness did not qualify as an
expert.
Similarly, Clark v. Cotten '3 considered whether the trial court had prop-
erly excluded the testimony of a state trooper who the plaintiff presented as
an accident reconstruction expert. The state trooper had been employed
with the Department of Public Safety for eight-and-a-half years, had re-
ceived seventeen weeks of training, and had investigated 350 accidents.
When the officer investigated the accident in question, he saw "eraser
marks" on the highway, which indicated to him that the defendant's west-
bound vehicle had either skidded or hydroplaned after hitting a puddle of
water, causing it to run into the eastbound lane and strike plaintiffs auto-
mobile. The state trooper testified that he had been taught that a car could
"hydroplane" at fifty-six miles per hour when running through water.
Notwithstanding the officer's training and experience, the court of civil ap-
peals held that the officer was not qualified to render an opinion regarding
the ultimate cause of the accident.
A police officer's prior experience and training, however, can qualify
him to be an expert in some areas. In Wood v. State, 4 involving an appeal
of a conviction for aggravated promotion of prostitution, the appellant ar-
gued that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing a police
officer to testify as an expert regarding the contents of 2,000 three-by-five
10. 579 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
II. Id at 530.
12. The record revealed neither the name of the institution from which the witness's
master's degree was obtained, the content of the program that led to the master's degree, nor
the length of her employment as a placement worker.
13. 573 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
14. 573 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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index cards and several stenographic pads seized during the execution of a
search warrant. The officer testified at trial that he had previously investi-
gated thirty to forty aggravated promotion of prostitution cases. He also
testified that client lists similar to those seized from appellant had been
confiscated by him on at least ten prior occasions, and that, in his experi-
ence, the majority of the lists seized maintained the same symbols. The
court of criminal appeals concluded that the trial court acted within its
discretion in allowing the officer to testify as an expert with regard to client
lists generally used in prostitution enterprises.'
5
Underlying Data. An expert is generally required to state the underlying
facts or other data upon which his opinion is based. In Roth v. Law' 6 a
mother brought suit against a truck driver and his employer for injuries
that she and her daughter had sustained when their vehicle collided with
the defendant's truck. The defendants argued on appeal that the trial
court erred in allowing an opthalmologist to testify concerning the daugh-
ter's retinal detachment, because two of his opinions were based solely on
other physicians' opinions found in the hospital's records and the records
of a Dr. McPherson, who had previously examined the child's retina. The
evidence indicated that the opthalmologist had made his only examination
of the child's eye slightly over a month before the case went to trial. He
performed a routine examination, but due to an advanced cataract cloud-
ing the child's eye, he was unable personally to examine the damaged ret-
ina. Relying on retinal drawings prepared by Dr. McPherson, the witness
testified that a subsequent accident did not cause the child's retinal detach-
ment, and further that the accident in issue probably did cause the detach-
ment. The court of civil appeals concluded that the witness's testimony
was not based on the opinions of other physicians. The appellate court
found no indication in the record that the expert relied on the opinions of
other physicians, emphasizing that the retinal drawings were objective
findings rather than opinion. 7 The court thus held that the expert was
entitled to base his testimony regarding the subsequent accident totally
upon the drawings.'"
Moore v. Grantham' 9 addressed the perennial inquiry regarding the ex-
tent to which an expert's opinion may be based on hearsay. Moore in-
volved an action for damages resulting from personal injuries sustained
when the defendant's automobile struck the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle.
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the jury's verdict. On
appeal, the defendant's primary concern was the jury's award of $39,600
for the plaintiff's loss of future earning capacity. Prior to the accident,
plaintiff had been trained and had worked as an interior designer. She
15. Id. at 211.
16. 579 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
17. Id. at 953. Retinal drawings are hand sketched reproductions reflecting what the
doctor views when looking into the patient's dilated eye.
18. Id
19. 580 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ granted).
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testified that she had attempted to return to interior design work after the
accident, but her injuries had precluded her doing so. Plaintiff also called
as a witness the director of the Rehabilitation Counselor Education Pro-
gram and a professor of vocational rehabilitation counseling at the Univer-
sity of Texas. The witness testified that, in his opinion, the plaintiffs loss
of future earning capacity was $39,200, which sum represented the differ-
ential between the plaintiffs future career expectancy as an interior deco-
rator and her current employment as assistant manager of a retail store.2°
The defendant did not complain that the witness was unqualified to tes-
tify as a vocational rehabilitation expert. Rather, the defendant argued
that the witness's testimony was based wholly on hearsay. Recognizing
that all expert testimony is significantly based upon hearsay, the court of
civil appeals rejected the defendant's assertion.2' The court stated that the
"recent trend" is to recognize that objections of this nature go to the weight
rather than the admissibility of the evidence.22 Following recent decisions
of the Texas Supreme Court,23 Moore held that once an expert is qualified,
the issue of admissibility becomes whether the basis of the expert's opinion
and the sources of information relied upon are of the type reasonably and
customarily relied upon by experts in that particular field. 24 The Texas
Supreme Court has granted writ on this case.25
Reasonable Probability. A medical expert's testimony must establish cau-
sation in terms of reasonable medical probability in order to support a
jury's finding of liability.26 The trier of fact is allowed to determine causa-
tion when it can do so from either general experience and common sense,
when scientific principle proven by expert testimony has established causa-
tion, or when probable causation is established by expert testimony.27 In
Stodghill v. Texas Employers Insurance Association" a workers' compen-
sation case, the widow and children of a deceased employee had been
20. The witness reviewed the correspondence and deposition of plaintiffs orthopedist
who testified at trial, and correspondence from plaintiffs former employers and clients. The
witness also interviewed a University of Texas home economics professor specializing in
interior design, and researched Manpower and Department of Labor surveys and statistics.
He testified that his training and expertise enabled him to take such statistical data and to
reach an opinion as to the vocational limitations imposed upon a person by medical disabil-
ity and the person's resulting capabilities in the labor market. Id at 147.
21. Id at 148.
22. Id
23. Slaughter v. Abilene State School, 561 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. 1977); Lewis v. South-
more Savings Ass'n, 480 S.W.2d 180, 186-87 (Tex. 1972).
24. 580 S.W.2d at 148. The court cautioned that an expert may not rely on "just any"
hearsay. Id. The court found, however, that the expert based his testimony on sources that
were customarily relied upon by other experts in his field and upheld the trial court's admis-
sion of the expert's testimony. Id
25. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 38 (Oct. 27, 1979). After the end of the survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that an expert opinion based solely on hearsay is inadmis-
sible. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227 (Mar. 1, 1980).
26. E.g., Insurance Co. of N. America v. Myers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. 1966).
27. Eg., Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970).
28. 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979).
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awarded death benefits under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act.29
The decedent had suffered injuries from a fall while he was actively en-
gaged in his employment. Immediately following the fall, the decedent's
blood pressure rose above normal levels. The evidence also indicated,
however, that the decedent had a history of high blood pressure. While
recuperating at his home the decedent suffered a heart attack and died
shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs produced an expert witness who testified that
the probable cause of the decedent's heart attack was increased tension
brought about by the physical injuries and mental stress resulting from the
fall. The defendant produced an expert who testified that the decedent's
heart attack was not caused by the injuries suffered in the employment
accident.
The court of civil appeals concluded that the cause of the decedent's
heart attack was determinable only from the testimony of medical experts
and, because plaintiffs' proof failed to rise to the level of reasonable medi-
cal probability, judgment was rendered for the defendant. 30 The supreme
court, however, concluded otherwise. The court stated that a medical ex-
pert need not use the words "reasonable medical probability" to support a
finding of causation. The testimony is sufficient if the circumstances
demonstrate that the substance of the expert's testimony rises to that
level.3 The court then held that plaintiffs' expert's testimony, even though
strongly rebutted, constituted "some direct evidence of probative force of
the causal connection between the injury and the death."32
The supreme court in Stodghill distinguished Insurance Co. of North
America v. Myers33 and Parker v. Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance
Co. 34 on the ground that the evidence presented in support of causation in
those cases amounted to no more than establishing a "possibility" of a
causal connection.35 Also distinguished were Commercial Standard Fire &
Marine Co. v. Thornton,36 in which the causal connection could only be
inferred by the jury from their general experience and common sense, and
Baird v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association,3 in which circumstantial
evidence was needed to establish that an on-the-job accidental injury was
the cause of a fatal heart attack.
In Hoppe v. Hughes38 the court of civil appeals was presented with the
issue of whether causation was established as a medical probability or as a
mere possibility. The survivors of a head-on automobile collision brought
29. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309f (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
30. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stodghill, 570 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1978).
31. Id at 105 (citing Lucas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 552 S.W.2d 796, 797
(Tex. 1977)).
32. 582 S.W.2d at 105.
33. 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
34. 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
35. 582 S.W.2d at 105.
36. 540 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
37. 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973).
38. 577 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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suit against the estate of the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the
accident. The jury failed to find that the deceased driver was negligent,
even though his automobile crossed the center line and the collision oc-
curred in the plaintiffs' lane of traffic. The basis of the excuse presented
for the decedent's statutory violation was that he had suffered a heart at-
tack immediately prior to the collision. In reversing the decision of the
trial court, the court of civil appeals reviewed the evidence to ascertain
whether the medical testimony satisfied the reasonable probability stan-
dard. When the defendant's medical expert was asked whether the dece-
dent had suffered some type of cardiovascular accident prior to the
automobile collision, which caused him to lose control of his car, he re-
plied that it was possible that the decedent suffered from a cardiovascular
attack immediately prior to the collision, but he admitted that his reply
was pure supposition.39 The court of civil appeals concluded that the med-
ical testimony did not rise to the level of reasonable probability; therefore,
the jury's failure to find that the decedent was negligent in traveling on the
wrong side of the roadway was against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence.4°
A fire inspector's opinion, articulated in terms of "possibilities," was
held to be admissible in Ralph v. Mr. Paul's Shoes, Inc. 41 The plaintiff
brought suit for fire damage alleging specific acts of negligence. The de-
fendant appealed from an adverse judgment, complaining that the testi-
mony of the fire inspector offered by the plaintiff at trial did not support
the jury's verdict. The inspector testified that he had had five years of
experience in investigation and that in his opinion the fire's origin was in
the trash can of the defendant's storeroom. The evidence showed that,
shortly before the fire began, the defendant's waitresses had been smoking
in the bar's storeroom and then emptied their ashtrays into the storeroom's
trash can. He also testified that he observed the physical evidence of the
fire and that there was an absence of any other reasonable origin of the
fire.42 The defendant claimed that there was no probative evidence to sup-
port the trial court's judgment in that the opinions of the fire inspector, the
only witness to testify on causation, were qualified by the term "possibly,"
and were therefore merely conjectural. Although the appellate court
found in the record only one unqualified statement of causation made by
the witness, the court analyzed the substance of the witness's testimony
and held that he had used the word "possibly" in the sense of "proba-
bly."'43 The court therefore concluded that the inspector's testimony was
39. Id at 776-77. The doctor also testified that, although the decedent was susceptible
to heart attack, he could have had a stroke, could have suffered from transient amnesia,
could have had a convulsion, gone to sleep, or reached for a cigarette and dropped a match,
thereby causing him to lose control of his vehicle.
40. Id. at 778.
41. 572 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. His investigation also consisted of interviewing several people at the scene, includ-
ing the firemen called to the scene, the manager of defendant's bar, and two of the bar's
waitresses.
43. 572 S.W.2d at 814.
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probative evidence concerning causation of the fire."
In Crocker v. State45 the court of criminal appeals, in affirming the de-
fendant's conviction for castration of his son, applied the civil causation
standard of reasonable medical probability.46 On motion for rehearing,
however, the court expressly held that the civil standard of reasonable
medical probability has no place in criminal trials and disavowed all lan-
guage in its original opinion that utilized the civil standard for establishing
causation in a criminal trial.47 In a concurring opinion Justice Douglas
implied that evidence establishing causation to a reasonable medical
probability was sufficient to meet the prosecution's burden of proving cau-
sation beyond a reasonable doubt.48 The majority's emphatic disavowal of
its original opinion, however, makes it apparent that Justice Douglas's po-
sition is not likely to prevail in future cases.
Nature of Opinion That Is Admissible. Texas courts have long recognized
that although damages for loss of future earning capacity are uncertain,
they are recoverable if "proved with that degree of certainty of which the
case is susceptible., 49 The proof of loss of future earning capacity is espe-
cially difficult when the plaintiff is a child who has not only never earned
wages, but also has not yet demonstrated any abilities or aptitudes." For
example, in Roth v. Law5 the court of civil appeals allowed the plaintiffs
expert to testify regarding the child's loss of future earning capacity. The
expert stated that the type of jobs that would be available when the child
would enter the work force could be so different from those jobs presently
available that it would be extremely difficult to estimate her loss of work
capacity. He further stated that the child's capacity to work and gain pro-
motion could be reduced by twenty-five to fifty percent. Even though the
expert acknowledged that his testimony was only a "guesstimate," the
court of civil appeals held that the trial court did not err in admitting such
testimony, reasoning that the "guesstimate" label the expert gave his opin-
ion went to the weight of the opinion, rather than to its admissibility.52
The manner in which a question is formed to elicit opinion testimony
often results in the introduction of incompetent evidence. For example, in
Cottle v. Knapper,53 a will contest, the plaintiff brought suit for cancella-
tion of a deed from Flora Miller conveying certain property to the Cottles.
The stated consideration for the deed was love and affection. The plaintiff
44. Id.
45. 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
46. Id at 203.
47. 1d at 207.
48. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
49. Mclver v. Gloria, 140 Tex. 566, 568, 169 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1943).
50. Eg., English v. Hegi, 337 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no
writ). When a child is claiming lost future earnings and the claim is not susceptible to a high
degree of proof, the jury must base its award for lost future earnings, if any, on its "common
knowledge and sense of justice." Id
51. 579 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. Id at 959.
53. 571 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
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contended that the property was deeded because of undue influence and
mental incapacity on the part of Flora Miller. The trial court set the deed
aside, and the judgment expressly recited that Flora Miller did not have
the sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of her
act. On cross-examination, the plaintiff, who was acting pro se,5 4 was
asked whether the decedent "did not have the mental capacity to make a
deed." The plaintiff replied that the decedent "did not." 5
The court of civil appeals held that the plaintiffs testimony was not ad-
missible to support the trial court's finding that Flora Miller lacked the
requisite mental capacity when she signed the deed. The appellate court
concluded that the question asked the plaintiff was improper and the elic-
ited testimony was therefore inadmissible. The court reasoned that the de-
cedent's mental capacity to execute the deed involved a legal definition
and a legal test, and thus the answer to the question asked could not be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence.56 Because the
trial court's judgment recited a specific reason for the rendition of judg-
ment,57 the appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the
evidence was not of sufficient strength to support the judgment. 58
II. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Official Writings and Ancient Documents. Official written statements have
long been admissible in Texas under an exception to the hearsay rule on
the ground that documents or statements made pursuant to an official duty
are inherently trustworthy.59 Similarly, an "ancient document" at least
thirty years old, unsuspicious in appearance, and produced from a place of
custody natural for such a writing can also be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule.6" The Texas Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
vitality of these two exceptions in Zobel v. Slim, 6 ' a trespass to try title suit.
The plaintiffs introduced into evidence an 1894 judgment entered in a law-
suit between the heirs of George Childress, from whom the plaintiffs
claimed title, and persons claiming title under an administrator's deed.
The 1894 judgment recited that the suit had been prosecuted in the name
of the heirs of George Childress, and recited the names of the plaintiffs
54. Although the court was aware that the plaintiff was representing herself in the litiga-
tion, id at 61, the court made short shrift of the fact that the controversial evidence was
received without objection and that it was elicited on cross-examination by counsel for the
Cottles. Id at 62.
55. Id. at 62.
56. A witness with the requisite knowledge or expertise may only be asked whether a
grantor knows or had capacity to know the object of his or her bounty, the nature of the
transaction in which he or she was engaged, the nature and extent of his or her estate, and
similar related questions. Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965).
57. 571 S.W.2d at 63.
58. Id at 64.
59. 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 9, § 1272. For a general discussion of the
official written statements exception to the hearsay rule, see id § 1271-1293.
60. Id., supra note 9, § 1372. See generally Wickes, Ancient Documents and Hearsay, 8
TEXAS L. REV. 451 (1930).
61. 576 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1978).
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who were awarded title to the property in question. The defendants
presented no evidence to the contrary, but merely claimed that the recita-
tions in the judgment were conclusory, self-serving, made after descent
had been cast, and therefore inadmissible hearsay. The trial court granted
plaintiffs' motion for an instructed verdict, entering judgment that plain-
tiffs recover title and possession to five acres of land.
The court of civil appeals agreed with the defendants' contentions and
held that the judgment failed to show as a matter of law the identity of the
heirs of George W. Childress.62 The supreme court reversed and held that
recitals in an ancient document are admissible as evidence of the facts re-
cited therein under the well-recognized "ancient documents" exception to
the hearsay rule.63 The supreme court distinguished the instant case from
the cases relied on by the defendants64 on the ground that those cases did
not involve the recitals of heirship in a judgment entered in a lawsuit in
which the court determined heirship to grant relief. The court reasoned
that "[a]s a practical matter, there is usually no other way to prove the
heirship of a person who died in 1836 than by the recitations in ancient
documents. The 1894 judgment is particularly reliable because it had to
determine heirship in a contested proceeding. '65 In an interesting fusion
of the official writings rule with the ancient documents rule, the court held
that "in the absence of rebutting evidence, recitations of heirship in an
ancient judgment entered in a lawsuit that had to determine heirship in
order to grant relief establish heirship as a matter of law.",66
Res Gestae. In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Gr!fith67 the plaintiff
brought a products liability suit against the installer of a mobil telephone
unit for injuries sustained when the telephone unit came loose from its
mounting and allegedly caused a vehicular accident. The defendant ap-
pealed from an adverse judgment and argued inter alia that the trial court
erred in excluding the res gestae statement of an unidentified motorist.
The evidence indicated that the unidentified witness approached the inves-
tigating police officer at least forty-five minutes after the officer arrived on
the scene. The witness did not observe the accident but merely observed
the plaintiff driving his vehicle prior to the accident.
Although a res gestae statement in the form of an opinion or conclusion
is generally inadmissible,68 some case law indicates a trend away from this
62. Slim v. Zobel, 552 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977).
63. 576 S.W.2d at 365.
64. Byers v. Wallace, 87 Tex. 503, 28 S.W. 1056 (1894); Walker v. Barrow, 464 S.W.2d
480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971, writ refd n.r.e.); Slattery v. Adams, 279
S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1954), affd, 156 Tex. 433, 295 S.W.2d 859 (1956);
Smith v. Lynn, 152 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, no writ).
65. 576 S.W.2d at 365.
66. Id.
67. 575 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
68. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Plains Transp. Co., 367 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1963) (per curiam)
(defendant's employee's statements that collision was his fault "were pure conclusions and
opinions" and therefore inadmissible under res gestae rule); Worley Hospital, Inc. v. Cald-
well, 529 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975), rev'don other grounds, 547 S.W.2d
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rule.69 Factual evidence, however, is generally admissible in the event the
requisites of the res gestae rule are satisfied.7" Whether a declaration is
spontaneous and arises out of the transaction itself is to be determined by
the circumstances of each particular case and must necessarily be left
largely to the discretion of the trial court.7 There must be independent
proof of the transaction out of which a spontaneous declaration arises.72 A
spontaneous declaration may either immediately precede or follow the
transaction,73 and is not necessarily inadmissible because it is in response
to a nonleading question74 or is self-serving in nature.75
In Griffith the court of civil appeals held that the unidentified motorist's
582 (Tex. 1977) (doctor's statement to nurse that "we are in trouble" inadmissible as conclu-
sion of liability); Galveston Transit Co. v. Morgan, 408 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton 1966, no writ) (statement by nonparty to defendant carrier that "it's not your fault" was
inadmissible as a conjectural and speculative opinion by a lay witness); Knapik v. Edison
Brothers, 313 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, writ ref'd) (statement by defendant's
employee using the phrase "and you know it" held inadmissible as an opinion and conclu-
sion); Morgan v. Maunders, 37 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1930, writ dism'd)
(statement by witness that defendant was driving "awfully fast" was inadmissible since it
was a conclusion and indefinite).
69. E.g., Gonzalez v. Layton, 429 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no
writ). Although the court held that the witness's statement as to "fault" was properly ex-
cluded because it failed to meet the requirements of the res gestae rule, the court stated: "It
seems clear that the modem text writers and courts are leaning toward the admission of...
opinion statements where they are spontaneous, a part of the res gestae, and couched in
language setting forth a shorthand rendition of facts, or are used for an impeachment pur-
pose." Id. at 219.
70. Strickland v. Pioneer Bus Co., 427 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (written statement signed by defendant's driver fifteen to twenty min-
utes after accident admissible); Caton v. Kelley, 424 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (statement by defendant's waitress a few minutes after
plaintiff fell, that the floor in restaurant was slippery and that she had slipped on it twice
before that day admissible); Payne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 409 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ refd n.r.e.) (wife's statement to brother-in-law held admissible
because declarant had just seen disaster, knew her husband was in serious condition, and
had just finished riding to hospital with him).
71. E.g., Galveston Transit Co. v. Morgan, 408 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, no writ) (spontaneous declaration of personal liability held admissible as part of res
gestae; however, exclusion of statement "I'm to blame" not an abuse of discretion because
declarant not a party and statement merely cumulative of other evidence); Lusinger v. Phil-
pott, 392 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (statement by bystander
that defendant "was going too fast" held admissible as part of res gestae); 1 C. MCCORMICK
& R. RAY, supra note 9, § 917, at 696.
72. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1966)
(statements by injured employee as to cause of his injury inadmissible because no proof of
accident itself and statements could not be used to prove accident); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. 1963) (statement of widow inadmissible to prove acci-
dent because no other independent proof offered).
73. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. I, 7-8, 161 S.W.2d 474, 477 (1942) (sponta-
neous pretransaction declaration admissible); Coleman v. Donaho, 559 S.W.2d 860, 863
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd) (writ dismissed without reference
to merits of appeal) (spontaneous post-transaction declaration admissible).
74. Davis Transp. Co. v. Bolstad, 295 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no
writ) (plaintiff regained consciousness for few moments and was asked what caused acci-
dent; answer admissible).
75. Gilmer v. Griffin, 265 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ refd




statements were not admissible and that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in refusing to admit them.76 The court reasoned that the state-
ments of the witness were not shown to have been in spontaneous reaction
to an exciting event. The court distinguished the two decisions relied upon
by the defendant77 on the ground that they both involved statements made
by declarants to the testifying witness at the time of the exciting event. The
purported res gestae statements in Groith were made almost an hour after
the accident and therefore lacked the requisite spontaneity "to save them
from the suspicion of being either manufactured or unreliable evidence."78
Judicial Admissions. Before a statement can be considered a judicial ad-
mission, it must meet certain requirements. The statement must be made
during the course of a judicial proceeding; it must be contrary to an essen-
tial fact or defense asserted by the person testifying; it must be deliberate,
clear, and unequivocal; giving conclusive effect to the statement must be
consistent with public policy; and the statement in question must not also
destroy the opposing party's theory of recovery.7 9 William B. Roberts, Inc.
v. McDriling Co. 80 addressed the issue of whether equivocal testimony
may constitute a judicial admission. In Roberts the plaintiff brought suit
against a corporate property owner and the corporation's president, at-
tempting to recover damages for a breach of a written contract or, in the
alternative, fraud, relating to the drilling of two wells. The trial court en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed. One defend-
ant, Roberts, complained on appeal that the trial court erred in rendering
judgment against him individually because there was no evidence to justify
invoking the alter ego doctrine. Evidence elicited at trial showed that the
stock of the corporation was wholly owned by Roberts, his wife, and his
daughter. All of the corporation's earnings were reported as earnings of
the shareholders. Roberts personally made all the decisions of the corpo-
ration and stated at trial that he considered himself to be personally re-
sponsible for the dealings of the corporation and personally liable for the
obligations he had contracted for and on behalf of the corporation. Plain-
tiff argued that this evidence constituted a judicial admission by Roberts
that the corporation was Roberts' alter ego.
The court of civil appeals, in ruling that Roberts' testimony was not a
judicial admission,"' relied on another statement in Roberts' testimony: "I
feel like the corporation stands on its own."82 The court reasoned that,
76. 575 S.W.2d at 103.
77. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. I, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); Claybrook v.
Acreman, 373 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
78. 575 S.W.2d at 103.
79. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1951, writ ref d). The public policy from which the rule is deduced is that it
would be unjust to allow a party to recover after he has unequivocally given testimony
contrary to his present position. Id at 229.
80. 579 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
81. Id at 345.
82. Id at 344.
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although Roberts later testified that he considered himself personally lia-
ble for the corporation's contracts, the effect of his entire testimony
amounted to an equivocation and hence did not meet the requirements of
81a judicial admission.
Hearsay as Corroboration. Agency cannot ordinarily be established by a
declaration of the alleged agent alone.84 When other prima facie evidence
of agency or employment exists, however, declarations of an alleged agent
are admissible as corroboration. 5 The court of civil appeals applied this
principle in Texas Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs.86 In Gibbs the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's admission into evidence of a witness's testi-
mony regarding a declaration of agency that had been made to him by
defendant's otherwise unidentified employee. Relying on the common law
presumption that a person found performing the work of another is pre-
sumed to be in the employment of the person whose work is being per-
formed,87 the court of civil appeals reasoned that although the identity of
the person operating the truck in question was unknown, and he could not
be produced as a witness, there was no evidence, either direct or circum-
stantial, to contradict the plaintiffs testimony that the accident occurred on
the defendant's premises. As there was no evidence to show that the oper-
ator of the truck was not the defendant's employee, the court of civil ap-
peals liberally interpreted the employer presumption by allowing the
declaration of agency to be admitted into evidence not by the alleged agent
himself, but through the testimony of a third party.88
III. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Waiver. It is well established that initiating an inquiry through a deposi-
tion of an adverse party regarding transactions with a deceased can waive
the application of the dead man's statute.89 Whether the dead man's stat-
ute can be similarly waived by propounding interrogatories is, however,
unclear.9° During this survey period the Houston (1st District) court of
83. Id. at 345.
84. Eg., Palmer v. Radcliff Fin. Corp., 344 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
85. Eg., McAfee v. Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 323, 153 S.W.2d 442, 448 (1941).
86. 580 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]), writ refdn.r.e.,per curiam, 584
S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1979).
87. Eg., Ochoa v. Winerich Motor Sales Co., 127 Tex. 542, 548, 94 S.W.2d 416, 418
(1936).
88. 580 S.W.2d at 44.
89. E.g., Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 322-23, 294 S.W.2d 801, 809 (1956);
Pinchback v. Pinchback, 352 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
Texas courts have held that the dead man's statute is waived even though the deposition has
not been offered into evidence. Allen v. Pollard, 109 Tex. 536, 212 S.W. 468 (1920). The text
of the Texas dead man's statute appears at note 94 infra.
90. The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion refusing an application for writ
of error in Fleming v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 554 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco), writ re'd n.r.e per curiam, 561 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1977), wrote that its ruling of no
reversible error should not be construed as approval of the portion of the court of civil
appeal's opinion that pertained to waiver of the dead man's statute by interrogatories that
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civil appeals held that addressing interrogatories that inquire of an oppos-
ing party regarding transactions with the deceased constitutes a waiver of
the dead man's statute.9 ' In Muhm v. Davis9 2 the plaintiff brought suit to
set aside two deeds. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted the defendants' motion that was supported by an affidavit
that included testimony regarding transactions with the deceased grantor.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly considered
the affidavit because, among other things, it included the testimony regard-
ing the transactions with the deceased. The court of civil appeals, in af-
firming the trial court, ruled that the plaintiff had initiated the inquiry by
propounding interrogatories to the defendant regarding the transactions
with the deceased, and that therefore the plaintiff waived the dead man's
statute, at least insofar as that particular transaction was concerned.93
A common misconception arising from the dead man's statute94 is that
the statute prohibits the introduction of written statements of the decedent.
This misconception surfaced in Wilson v. Wilson,95 a will contest. The
court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the probate court because
the probate court admitted certain inadmissible evidence that was consid-
ered to be highly prejudicial.96 In its opinion, however, the appellate court
addressed a counterpoint presented by the appellee. The appellee argued
that the probate court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a contest to
an application filed by the appellant to have the decedent declared men-
tally incompetent. The trial court refused to admit the document on the
basis that it was barred by the dead man's statute, or alternatively, that the
document was a statement by the decedent and not admissible for the pur-
pose of proving undue influence. The appellate court disagreed and con-
cluded that article 3716 does not prevent parties from relying upon written
instruments executed by the decedent as a basis of either recovery or de-
fense. The court reasoned that the statute only prevents the parties them-
inquired about transactions with the deceased. Nevertheless, if initiating an inquiry con-
cerning transactions with the deceased waives the statute, no logical reason exists for making
a distinction among the various methods of making such an inquiry. An inquiry into trans-
actions can just as readily be made by written interrogatories or requests for admissions as
by questioning on oral deposition.
91. Muhm v. Davis, 580 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 101.
94. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926) provides:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement
by, the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the oppo-
site party; and the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all
actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out
of any transaction with such decedent.
95. 581 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), rev'dper curiam on other grounds, 587
S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
96. The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals because the evidence that the
appellate court held inadmissible was found to be relevant and therefore admissible under
the controlling statute. Wilson v. Wilson, 587 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
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selves from testifying concerning transactions with the decedent; 97 thus,
the written document did not fall within the prohibitions of the dead man's
statute.98
IV. No PROBATIVE EVIDENCE
Many cases address the issue of whether there is any evidence in the
record to support the determinations made by the trier of fact.99 In Cross
v. City of Dallas,"°' for example, the plaintiff was injured when she fell
into a water meter hole built and maintained by the city of Dallas. The
jury rendered a verdict favorable to the plaintiff. The trial court, however,
granted the city's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
the plaintiff appealed. The evidence indicated that the water meter had
been read by an employee of the city approximately eighteen days before
the accident. The water meter lids normally were locked and city person-
nel used a special key to unlock the lids when reading the meters. The lid
could be removed without a key but, according to the evidence, only by
actions that would leave scratches or marks on the locking mechanism.
The city examined the lid after the accident and found no evidence of any
damage. The water meter serviced a warehouse, and a representative of
that warehouse testified that no plumbing or building maintenance had
been performed on the warehouse for at least two months before the acci-
dent, and that he did not open the lid nor observe any of his employees
doing so. On the basis of this evidence, the court of civil appeals held that
the jury could have reasonably inferred that the city negligently failed to
lock the water meter lid and that this failure caused the plaintiffs dam-
ages."°' The court thereupon reversed the judgment of the trial court and
rendered judgment for plaintiff.'" 2
In Guffey v. Borden, Inc. i03 a truck driver delivering a load of warm
liquid wax slipped on the wax and sustained injuries. The jury found the
defendant one hundred per cent negligent. The evidence indicated that a
small leak of wax was coming from the hose coupling that the plaintiff was
using to transfer the wax from his truck to the defendant's tanks. The
defendant's employee applied pressure to the coupling and the latch disen-
gaged resulting in a wax spill. Upon observing this situation, the plaintiff
turned off the safety valve on the truck to prevent more wax from being
discharged. He stepped into some wax on that occasion but did not fall.
After shutting off the safety valve, the plaintiff walked to the place where
the uncoupled hose was lying in a pool of wax and reached down to pick it
up. He slipped and fell on that occasion and sustained injuries. The jury
97. 581 S.W.2d at 731.
98. Id.
99. For an excellent discussion of this general area of the law, see Calvert, "No Evi-
dence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 361 (1960).
100. 581 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Id at 516.
102. Id
103. 595 F.2d 1 I 11 (5th Cir. 1979).
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rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed,
claiming there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the ver-
dict.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was primarily concerned about the
finding of one hundred percent negligence against the defendant. The
court observed that the plaintiff had failed to act as an ordinary, prudent
man when, aware of the wax spill and its slippery propensities, he deliber-
ately walked into the pool of wax to retrieve the disjoined hose. Since the
plaintiff was at least partially negligent, the court of appeals held that the
jury's finding of one hundred percent negligence against the defendant was
not supported by the evidence. The judgment of the trial court was there-
upon reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial."°4
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Davis'0 5 presented the issue of
whether there was any probative evidence to support the jury's findings
that the defendant was grossly negligent in entrusting a vehicle to its em-
ployee and that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of exemplary dam-
ages. The evidence reflected that the defendant hired the driver without
inquiring or checking into his driving record, that the employee had his
driver's license suspended for two years prior to his employment because
he was a habitual violator of the traffic laws, and that, during his employ-
ment with the defendant, he was convicted of four traffic violations that
involved two accidents. The evidence also demonstrated that the em-
ployee had a valid driver's license when he was employed by Southwestern
Bell, and that Southwestern Bell did not have any actual knowledge of his
driving record.
The court of civil appeals held that, although the evidence would amply
sustain a finding of ordinary negligence for the entrustment of the vehicle
to the employee, the evidence would not sustain a finding of gross negli-
gence. °6 The court concluded that the record failed to show that the de-
fendant was "consciously indifferent" to the rights or welfare of the
plaintiff.0 7 The appellate court therefore reformed the judgment, ordered
a remittitur, and affirmed the judgment as modified.
In Transport Insurance Co. v. Campbell'°8 the defendant appealed from
an adverse judgment entered in a workers' compensation case. The de-
fendant contended that there was no evidence that a blow to the back of
the plaintiffs head sustained in the course of his employment was the pro-
ducing cause of a stroke that resulted in his total incapacity. While the
plaintiff, a truck driver, was removing a mudflap attached to his tractor, he
slipped, fell backwards, and hit the back of his head against the trailer
dolly. Suffering no immediate adverse affects, the plaintiff reported the
104. The court of appeals also held that only a jury can determine the relative percent-
ages of negligence attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant under these circumstances.
Id at 1114.
105. 582 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
106. Id at 195.
107. Id. at 195-96.
108. 582 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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incident to his employer and continued working. He then drove approxi-
mately fifty miles and, although he was having no physical difficulty, de-
cided to take a rest. The next morning he had a slight headache which had
persisted since he bumped his head. He was not certain, however, if he
had the headache while he drove the fifty miles from his terminal. After
taking a shower and shaving, he took two aspirins for his headache, then
cleaned his truck and fueled up. While eating breakfast, he noted he was
losing control of his hand. Thereafter, while paying his bill his leg gave
way and he fell to the floor. He was then taken to the hospital and it was
determined that he had suffered a stroke causing paralysis to his left side.
The question presented in Campbell was whether the time interval be-
tween the incident and the manifestation of the plaintiffs physical problem
was such that it was reasonable to believe that his disability was job re-
lated. The treating physician testified that the plaintiff had developed a
clot in the brain or had a clot elsewhere which had traveled to the brain
and paralyzed the left side of the body. He considered it probable that the
blood clot was caused by high blood pressure, but recognized the slight
possibility that the bump on the head could have caused the stroke. An-
other doctor testified that in reasonable medical probability the cause of
the plaintiffs condition was the hardening of the arteries in the blood ves-
sels to the plaintiffs head and that the blow to the plaintiffs head had
nothing to do with the stroke. A third doctor testified that the plaintiffs
condition was probably due to clotting in the cerebral blood vessels. He
stated that of all the possible causes of the stroke the least likely was the
blow to the plaintiffs head and the most likely was hypertension. The
witness did admit, however, that there was a remote possibility that the
blow to the head did contribute to the stroke.
After recognizing that there is "no precise rule to measure probative
force" of evidence and to determine "if questions of fact are raised by the
evidence,"' 9 the court concluded that there was no medical testimony suf-
ficient to support the finding of the jury that there was a causal relation-
ship between the blow to the plaintiffs head and his stroke." 0 The court
determined that it was not enough that the plaintiff raise a mere surmise or
suspicion of the existence of causation, but the circumstances relied upon
must be of such a character as to be reasonably satisfactory and convinc-
ing.i"I The court thereupon reversed and rendered judgment for the ap-
pellant. Subsequently, however, on motion for rehearing, the court
concluded that its original opinion was in error and affirmed the decision
of the trial court. The court stated that it had erroneously failed to apply
the rule of Garza v. Alviar. 1 2 Garza dictates that, when determining
whether any evidence exists in the record to support a jury's finding, only
the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury finding may be
109. Id. at 176 (quoting Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex.
1973)).
110. 582 S.W.2d at 177.
111. Id
112. 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. 1965).
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considered and all evidence and inferences to the contrary must be disre-
garded. 3 The court then concluded that because "the medical testimony
to the effect that hypertension was the probable cause of the [stroke] must
be disregarded," ' 1 4 the evidence presented supported the conclusion that
the job-related incident precipitated the plaintiff's stroke.
In Dodd v. Texas Farm Products Co. 115 the Texas Supreme Court again
addressed the question of whether any evidence existed in the record to
support a jury finding. The plaintiff testified regarding the events preced-
ing an injury he received when a retaining wall collapsed on him. The
retaining wall acted as a support to hold in place sulphate that was used in
the defendant's business. Immediately prior to the collapse of the wall the
defendant had set off an explosion to loosen the sulphate. Following the
explosion, the defendant's foreman instructed the plaintiff to remove the
loosened pieces of sulphate near the retaining wall. Although the plaintiff
thought the wall was weakened by the explosion and informed his foreman
of his thoughts, he was again instructed by the foreman to remove the
sulphate. The plaintiff complied with his foreman's instructions and then
suffered injuries when the wall collapsed. While the jury found the com-
pany negligent in failing to inspect the wall after the explosion, and found
such negligence to be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the
trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the
defendant. The court of civil appeals affirmed," 6 holding that there was
no evidence to support the jury's finding of the defendant's negligence.
The supreme court reversed and rendered. In finding "some evidence,"
the Texas Supreme Court stated that it looked to the totality of the circum-
stances, including "the events, the time involved, the instruments involved,
and the surrounding circumstances" and that taken together, these factors
presented some evidence of a failure to properly inspect. 17
Business Records. In O'Shea v. International Business Machines Corp. 118
IBM filed suit alleging that the defendant failed to pay for equipment that
he had purchased pursuant to a written sale agreement. Judgment was
entered in IBM's favor, and the defendant appealed. Although the court
of civil appeals determined that the judgment in favor of IBM was based
on reversible error, the court addressed IBM's cross-points that com-
plained of the trial court's admission into evidence of certain computerized
business records to prove the amount of attorneys' fees that the defendant
incurred in support of his counterclaim. The appellate court observed that
the record was silent as to whether the computer equipment relied upon by
the defendant's law firm was recognized as standard equipment for use in
client billings, whether the records were prepared by persons who under-
113. Id at 823.
114. 582 S.W.2d at 178.
115. 576 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1979).
116. Dodd v. Texas Farm Prods., 567 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978).
117. 576 S.W.2d at 815.
118. 578 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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stood the operation of the equipment and who also regularly operated such
equipment, and whether daily processing of information was fed into the
computer in a manner that would enable the information to be retained in
the computer's permanent records storage bank." 9 The court held that,
because this proof is required under the business records exception in arti-
cle 3737e, 12° the trial court erred in admitting the computerized business
records. 121
In Steves Sash & Door Co. v. WBH International, 122 a suit on a sworn
account in which the defendant filed a plea of privilege, the plaintiff failed
to lay the required statutory predicate for the admissibility of the ledger
sheets and invoices.' 23 The court of civil appeals concluded that "absent
the required showing, the exhibits were clearly hearsay and lacking in pro-
bative force."' 124 Because the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case,
the court held that the trial court properly sustained the defendant's plea
of privilege. '
25
In Porter v. State126 the defendant was convicted of capital murder. At
the punishment phase of his trial, the trial court admitted certain letters,
reports, and documents from a federal parole officer's file pertaining to the
defendant's supervision and progress while on federal parole. The docu-
ments contained unfavorable references to the defendant's psychiatric con-
dition, his serious narcotic addiction, and the fact that his rehabilitative
rating was very poor. The defendant objected to the admission of these
119. Id. at 848. The court commented that the proper predicate for the introduction of
computerized business records is set forth in Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 468
S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
120. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1980).
121. 578 S.W.2d at 848.
122. 575 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
123. Article 3737e requires that an employee or representative who has personal knowl-
edge of the transaction either make the record or transmit the information to another who
makes the record in order to be admissible under the business records exception to the hear-
say rule. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § l(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). See Skillern &
Sons v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 305 (Tex. 1962). The plaintiff in WBH International failed
to lay a proper predicate for admission of the account ledger because he failed to offer proof
of the personal knowledge requirement of article 3737e. 575 S.W.2d at 357. Similarly, the
requirements of article 3737e are not satisfied when there is no proof that the record was
made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition to be proved. Carr Well Service, Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 587 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
124. 575 S.W.2d at 357. The court also indicated that the account, ledger sheets, and
invoices failed to show in "reasonable certainty" the nature of each item, the date, and the
charge therefor. The court reasoned that there was no evidence in the record that explained
the symbols and abbreviations used in the ledger sheets and the invoices. The exhibits were
therefore insufficient to establish "that the systematic record required by rule 185 has been
kept so as to constitute prima facia evidence of the debt." Id.
125. Id The court made its determination even though the defendant failed to object
when the ledger sheets and invoices were offered into evidence. Id. The court's determina-
tion that defendant's failure to object was irrelevant is correct in that the ledger sheets and
invoices were at all times hearsay because the plaintiff failed to lay a proper predicate. The
Texas courts have long held that hearsay is without probative force, whether objected to or
not. E.g., Texas Pipe Bending Co. v. Gibbs, 580 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.]), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 584 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1979); Perkins v. Springstun,
557 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
126. 578 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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records, claiming that the records violated his constitutional rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination.
The court of criminal appeals recognized that, although guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, the rights of confrontation and cross-exam-
ination "are not absolute."' 27 The court cited several statutes in which
documentary evidence was considered to be admissible notwithstanding
that it denied the party against whom the evidence was introduced the
right to cross-examine or confront the witness who made the document. 28
The court recognized, however, that the documents submitted into evi-
dence under these statutes must be of "such trustworthiness as to guaran-
tee the same protection provided by the constitutional rights of
confrontation and cross-examination."' 29 The court in Porter noted that
the documents introduced in the trial court "contained hearsay upon hear-
say," and that "[tihe sources of these opinions are in most cases unnamed,
and in no case are the authors or the unnamed sources shown to be compe-
tent to make the statements attributed to them." 3' The court then rea-
soned that simply because the documents were collected in a file in a
government office does not mean that they "have the indicia of reliability
sufficient to insure the integrity of the fact finding process commensurate
with the constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examinations."' 3 '
The court concluded that, although the documents may have been rele-
vant, their admission denied the defendant his rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. ' 32
V. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The best evidence rule provides that when the contents of a writing are
sought to be proved, and the writing pertains to a noncollateral issue, the
original writing must be produced, or its nonproduction accounted for.' 33
The rule applies only if the contents of the writing are sought to be
proved.' 4 The rule does not apply if the writing relates only to a collat-
eral issue.' 35 The rule also does not apply to "duplicate originals"' 36 but
127. Id. at 745.
128. The court cited TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 3731, 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1980).
129. 578 S.W.2d at 746.
130. Id
131. Id. The state argued that the trial court has wide discretion in admitting or exclud-
ing evidence at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. The court rejected this
contention, stating that this discretion extends only to the question of the relevance of the
facts sought to be proved. Id at 748.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Fechtel v. Gatewood, 470 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 9, §§ 1561-1563.
134. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Peralez, 546 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (best evidence of provisions and regulations of Texas
and U.S. Department of Transportation as to standards and conditions at railroad crossings
are regulations themselves); Middagh v. Tiller-Smith Co., 518 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1975, no writ) (company's vice president's testimony concerning reduction in sales
inadmissible because sales records best evidence).
135. See, e.g., Bains v. Parker, 143 Tex. 57, 182 S.W.2d 397 (1944) (parol evidence of
ownership of land admissible without production of deed or title because ownership not in
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does apply to and precludes the use of carbon copies and photographic or
photostatic copies.'37
In Prudential Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Black'38 the plaintiff appealed
from an adverse judgment in its suit seeking recovery of unpaid rents on a
lease agreement. Plaintiff sought to prove its ownership of the leased
premises through the testimony of a former member of a partnership that
had sold the leased premises to the plaintiff. The trial court excluded the
witness's testimony on the ground that the document of title was the best
evidence to establish plaintiffs ownership of the property. The appellate
court concluded that the question of ownership of the leased premises was
only collaterally related to the main issue of whether the defendant
breached the lease agreement. Thus the best evidence rule was incorrectly




Proof that a witness has been convicted of a criminal offense is admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes only if the offense is one involving moral
turpitude 4° and not too remote.' 4 ' The remoteness of a prior criminal
conviction, as it affects admissibility for impeachment purposes, is usually
dispute); Fannin Bank v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1968, writ dism'd) (oral testimony as to ownership of land admissible without production of
deed because title of land only collaterally involved). See also 2 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
supra note 9, § 1567.
136. See, e.g., Brown v. Leasing Assoc., Inc., 453 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (signed duplicate copy of assignment on cause of action
admissible); Cross v. Everybodys, 357 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ
refd n.r.e.) (photostatic copy of partnership termination agreement made and signed at
same time as typewritten copy admissible as duplicate original).
137. See, e.g., Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763 (1940)
(photostatic copies of out-of-state auto registration certificate, without authentication, inad-
missible); Pitcock v. B & W Inc., 476 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971,
writ ref d n.r.e.) (photostatic copy of photograph inadmissible); Hill v. Moore, 278 S.W.2d
472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954, no writ) (carbon copy of auto registration certificate
inadmissible without accounting for nonproduction of original); Great Am. Indem. Co. v.
Dabney, 128 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (unau-
thenticated carbon copy of autopsy report inadmissible). But cf. In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420
(Tex. 1977) (article 373 Ic allowed admission of photostatic copies of $ 100 bills that had been
returned to bank).
138. 572 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
139. Id at 380-81.
140. Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1970) (theft and forgery of pos-
tal money orders are crimes involving moral turpitude); Compton v. Jay, 389 S.W.2d 639
(Tex. 1965) (driving while intoxicated not a crime involving moral turpitude); British Am.
Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 574 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (conviction
for possession of heroine is crime of moral turpitude); Ka-Hugh Enterprises, Inc. v. Fort
Worth Pipe & Supply Co., 524 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1975, writ refd
n.r.e.) (conviction for income tax evasion was crime involving moral turpitude and could be
used to impeach credibility of witness).
141. Eg., Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1970); 1 C. Mc-
CORMICK & R. RAY, supra note 9, § 660. See also Elliott, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 135, 135-38 (1971).
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a matter within the discretion of the trial court.142
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Evans,'43 for example, a workers'
compensation case, the defendant attempted to impeach the plaintiff by
establishing that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor. In one of his
answers to interrogatories, which were introduced into evidence, the plain-
tiff stated that he had never been charged with a criminal offense other
than a traffic violation. The specific offense with which the defendant
sought to impeach the plaintiff was that, for the purpose of obtaining un-
employment benefits, the plaintiff knowingly made a false statement that
he had not worked to receive wages for the period in which he was seeking
employment compensation. The trial court denied the defendant the op-
portunity to impeach the plaintiff on the basis of that offense. The appel-
late court held that the making of a false affidavit for the purpose of
securing money benefits to which a person is not entitled is an offense in-
volving moral turpitude.'I As the conviction was not too remote, the ap-
pellate court concluded that it had a bearing upon plaintiffs present
credibility.' 45 The court therefore reversed the decision of the trial court
and remanded the matter for trial.
In Watkins v. Slate146 the defendant appealed from a conviction of two
counts of felony theft. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence of his convictions in 1971 and 1976 in the federal
courts because he had received a full presidential pardon for such offenses.
There was no allegation that his presidential pardon was received because
of subsequent proof of his innocence.147 The defendant's contention was
that his guilt was eradicated when he received his full, unconditional par-
don. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Carlesi v.
New York,' 48 the court of criminal appeals rejected the defendant's con-
tention. Carlesi held that, notwithstanding a full presidential pardon, a
prior federal conviction can be used as an enhancement count in a state
prosecution. 149 The court then concluded that although a pardon forgives
142. Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. 1970); see British Am.
Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 574 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ) (exclusion
of conviction four months prior to trial abuse of discretion); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Williams, 516 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (exclu-
sion of conviction five years and six months prior to trial not abuse of discretion); Calloway
v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 491 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (conviction twelve years before trial too remote and admission reversible error); Mill-
ers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 474 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ) (exclusion of conviction nine and one-half years before trial not abuse of
discretion).
143. 577 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Id. at 515.
145. Id at 515-16. Only fifteen months elapsed between the conviction and the alleged
injury, and less than three years between the conviction and the civil trial.
146. 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
147. The defendant's pardon was apparently based on his work as an undercover investi-
gator for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 572 S.W.2d at 341 n.2.
148. 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
149. Id. at 59.
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the penalty, it does not affect the conviction. 50 Accordingly, the court
overruled the defendant's claim and affirmed his conviction.
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence' 5 ' generally excludes evi-
dence of a person's character for the purpose of proving that he acted in
the same manner at the time of the occurrence in dispute.' 52 This general
rule of exclusion is based upon the assumption that such evidence is of
slight probative value and very prejudicial. In Reyes v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad'53 the court of civil appeals addressed the admissibility of such
character evidence. The plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained when
he was run over by defendant's train as he lay on the tracks at night. The
plaintiff explained his presence on the railroad tracks by claiming that,
while walking along the tracks, he was knocked unconscious by an un-
known assailant. The trial court admitted into evidence four prior misde-
meanor convictions of the plaintiff for public intoxication. The purpose of
the evidence was to show that the plaintiff was intoxicated on the night
that he was run over by the train. Judgment was entered for the defend-
ant, and the plaintiff appealed. The court of civil appeals concluded that
the prior convictions were inadmissible character evidence under rule 404,
because the evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction was admitted for the
sole purpose of showing that he had a character trait of drinking to excess
and that he acted in conformity with his character on the night of the acci-
dent by becoming intoxicated.
The defendant further sought to justify the admission of such evidence
by alleging that the prior convictions constituted relevant habit evi-
dence.' 5 4 Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 55 allows the intro-
150. 572 S.W.2d at 341-42.
151. FED. R. EVID. 404.
152. Rule 404 provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as pro-
vided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
153. 589 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1979).
154. For discussions on habit evidence, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 195 (2d ed. 1972); I J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 92 (3d ed. 1940). Habit evidence, unlike
character evidence, is considered to be of highly probative value because "the uniformity of
one's response to habit is far greater than the consistency with which one's conduct conforms
to character or disposition. C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 195, at 463.
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duction of evidence of the habit of a person for the purpose of proving that
the person acted in conformity with his habit on the particular occasion.' 56
Recognizing that no precise formula exists for determining if the offered
evidence is inadmissible character evidence or admissible habit evidence,
the court chose not to prescribe the precise quantum of proof necessary to
transform a general disposition for excessive drinking into a "'habit' of
intemperance."' 57 The court then found that the four prior convictions for
public intoxication spanning a three-and-one-half-year period were of in-
sufficient regularity to rise to the level of habit evidence.' 58 The evidence
was therefore held to be inadmissible, and the case was reversed and re-
manded for a new trial.159
The general rule in Texas is that a party is bound by the testimony of his
own witness.' 60 A party may, however, impeach his own witness when the
witness's testimony is injurious to the party putting him on the stand and
the testimony is a surprise to that party. 16 ' The rule against impeaching
one's own witness does not prevent a party from proving facts at variance
with or in contradiction of those facts testified to by the witness. 162
In Burleson v. Finley,163 a trespass to try title and assault case, the plain-
tiffs appealed from an adverse judgment claiming that, inter alia, the trial
court erred in allowing the defendants to impeach their own witness. The
defendants called Clinton P. Rippy, a surveyor who had surveyed the land
in question, as their witness. On direct examination, the defendants' coun-
155. FED. R. EVID. 406.
156. Rule 406 provides:
(a) Admissibility. Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine prac-
tice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or rou-
tine practice.
157. 589 F.2d at 795.
158. Id
159. Similarly, in Burleson v. Finney, 581 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.), a trespass to try title and an assault case, it was held that proof of prior
assaults committed by defendant was not admissible to show that the defendant committed
the assault in question. Id at 307-08. In Burleson, however, the court also concluded that, if
exemplary damages are sought, evidence of prior assaults is admissible on the issue of exem-
plary damages. Id
160. E.g., Pickett v. Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank, 24 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930,
holding approved); Anderson v. Anderson, 535 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no
writ).
161. See, e.g., Phlegm v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 453 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ); City of San Antonio v. Poulos, 403 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), af'd, 422 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1967).
162. See, e.g., Englebrecht v. W.D. Brannan & Sons, 501 S.W.2d 707, 711-12 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ) (where witness testified that it was not the custom in commu-
nity to charge if farmer dissatisfied with result of aerial spraying, evidence could not be
introduced to attack credibility of witness, but testimony would be admissible to contradict
witness's testimony as to custom in community); Hawkins v. Maxwell, 318 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1958, no writ) (plaintiff allowed to give testimony contradicting his attor-
ney's testimony); Shinn v. Dillon, 306 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, no
writ) (plaintiff permitted to give testimony contradicting his witness's testimony concerning
automobile accident).
163. 581 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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sel inquired whether one of the plaintiffs had told the witness that the
property line was the center of a certain creek. The witness replied that he
could not answer the question either "yes" or "no." The witness then testi-
fied that "it was understood between he and I [sic] that we were supposed
to survey up the center line of Brushy Creek, and not to go to the fence on
the other side."' 64 The trial court, over the plaintiffs' objection, permitted
the witness to read a previously signed affidavit in which the witness stated
that one of the plaintiffs had told him that the property line ran to the
center of the channel of the creek. The defendants contended that the ad-
mission of the affidavit was proper because they were entitled to impeach
their own witness because he had qualified or contradicted his statement
made earlier in his affidavit.
The Burleson court recognized that when a party is surprised by his wit-
ness's testimony, he is entitled to impeach the witness by showing that the
witness made prior statements that contradict his testimony given at trial.
The court stated, however, that the "testimony sought to be discredited
must be such as disproves, in some degree, the case of the party by whom
the witness is called."' 65 The court of civil appeals concluded that the evi-
dence failed to show that the defendant was either surprised by his wit-
ness's testimony or that the testimony disproved, in any degree, the
defendants' case. The court reasoned that the only "surprise" shown by
the witness's testimony was "counsel's statement that he was surprised,"1 66
and that, although the testimony did not meet the defendants' expecta-
tions, it did not disprove any part of the defendants' case. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court, however, because the plaintiffs failed to spec-
ify a particular rule of evidence that was violated by the admission of the
affidavit. As a result, the plaintiffs waived any error that existed.'
67
VII. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule provides that, in the absence of fraud, accident,
or mistake, parol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict or
vary the terms of a written instrument. 168 In Benson v. Jones'69 the plain-
tiffs brought suit on a written farm lease to recover rent, interest, damages
to land covered by the lease, and attorney's fees. The lease agreement pro-
vided that the plaintiffs would lease to the defendants a specified number
164. Id at 309.
165. 581 S.W.2d at 310.
166. Id
167. Id.
168. See cases decided during the survey period: Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three
Bears, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1979) (extrinsic evidence inadmissible to establish oral
option to purchase equipment where lease recited it was "sole agreement"); Caviness Pack-
ing Co. v. Corbett, 587 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (extrin-
sic evidence admissible to establish that ambiguous sales contract provision pertaining to
weight of cattle meant "at time of delivery"); Hinckley v. Eggers, 587 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (extrinsic evidence admissible to establish that investors
were liable as principals on deed of trust note even though not identified in note). See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 260, 285 S.W.2d 184, 190 (1955).
169. 578 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of tillable acres, with rent to be based on the "net" number of tillable
acres. The defendants offered extrinsic evidence to explain what the par-
ties intended by the use of the term "net" tillable acres. After judgment
was rendered that the plaintiffs take nothing, the plaintiffs appealed from
the portion of the judgment concerning their action to recover past due
rentals and interest, plus attorney's fees. The plaintiffs contended that the
trial court improperly permitted the defendants to introduce the parol tes-
timony because it varied the terms of the unambiguous written lease agree-
ment. The defendants asserted that the testimony was admissible because
the parties clearly intended the phrase rental "based on net tillable acres"
to mean rental determined by the number of tillable acres actually deliv-
ered to the defendants.
The court of civil appeals recognized that evidence adduced in violation
of the extrinsic evidence rule is incompetent and has no probative force
even though admitted without objection. 7 ' It also acknowledged, how-
ever, that even in the case of an unambiguous instrument, a trial court may
properly admit parol evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding
or pertaining to the making of the agreement for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the true intention of the parties. 17' The court therefore concluded that
the parol evidence was admissible to show the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the lease in order to ascertain the true intent of
the parties in their use of the term "net" tillable acres as it appeared in the
written agreement.
72
In Alba Tool & Supply Co. v. Industrial Contractors, Inc. 171 the Texas
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of parol evidence to explain
written contract terms alleged to be ambiguous. Industrial contractors en-
tered into a written contract with Alba for the sale of products to be manu-
factured by Industrial Contractors. The contract granted Alba the
"exclusive right to offer for sale," within the areas defined by the contract,
the products of Industrial Contractors. 174 Another paragraph of the same
contract stated that "Alba shall be the exclusive agent of [Industrial Con-
tractors] to sell such account[s]." '17 Before the contract expired, Industrial
Contractors cancelled the contract and Alba sued, seeking a five percent
commission on sales. On the basis of the parol evidence rule, the trial
court excluded testimony offered by Industrial Contractors' president to
explain the allegedly ambiguous sales areas as defined in the written agree-
ment.' 7 6 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but
170. Id at 484.
171. Id
172. Id at 485.
173. 585 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1979).
174. Paragraph 2 of the contract specifically provided: "2. Alba shall have the (exclu-
sive) (fin cclutisv) and (tfraf.c-able) (net tasfcr ) right to offer for sale within the
Area of Representation defined below products of the Manufacturer .. d.." Id at 663 n. I.
The deleted words were lined through and initialed by the parties to the contract. Id
175. Id
176. The area of representation was set out in paragraph 4: "4. AREA OF REPRESEN-
TATION: M.W. Kellogg, Litwin, Fluor Corp.-Houston & L.A., Tellepsen, Hydrocarbon
[Vol. 34
EVIDENCE
the court of civil appeals held the contract to be ambiguous and remanded
for admission of the parol evidence. 177 Reversing the court of civil appeals
and affirming the trial court's judgment, the supreme court found the con-
tract to be clear and unambiguous. 78 The court concluded that the area of
representation paragraph was not susceptible to more than one meaning
and that the use of the terms "exclusive right to offer for sale" and "exclu-
sive agent" in the same contract did not create an ambiguity.' 79 Finding
no ambiguity in the contract, the court followed clearly established law
that it is not error to exclude parol evidence offered to explain a contract
that is unambiguous on its face.
180
Const., S.I.P., Inc., Shell Oil and Chem., T.D.A. Edwards Engr., Dow Badische, American
Lurgi, Lurgi Group, Procon, Weatherby Engr., Celanese Corp. Engr.-Houston Division."
177. Industrial Contractors argued, and the court of civil appeals agreed, that paragraph
4 was susceptible to three different interpretations. Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Alba Tool
& Supply Co., 572 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978). The appel-
late court also held that the terms "exclusive right to offer for sale" and "exclusive agency"
created an additional ambiguity. Id
178. 585 S.W.2d at 665.
179. Id. at 664.
180. See Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800
(1940).
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